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Abstract
This paper uses a field experiment to investigate the quality of individuals’
forecasts of relative performance in tournaments. We ask players in luck-based
(poker) and skill-based (chess) tournaments to make point forecasts of rank. The
main finding of the paper is that players’ forecasts in both types of tournaments
are biased towards overestimation of relative performance. However, the size
of the biases found is not as large as the ones often reported in the psychology
literature. We also find support for the “unskilled and unaware hypothesis” in
chess: high skilled chess players make better forecasts than low skilled chess
players. Finally, we find that chess players’ forecasts of relative performance are
not eﬃcient.
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1 Introduction
A large body of empirical evidence from social psychology indicates that people
display a systematic tendency to overestimate relative skill. In settings where
relative skill matters for making decisions this may have important implications
for behavior. One such setting is a tournament.1 The decision to participate
in a tournament or the choice of how much eﬀort to put in depend on accurate
expectations of relative skill.
This paper uses a field experiment to test the rationality of players’ forecasts
of relative performance in tournaments. The experiment took place in two
poker tournaments—UCSD’s 2004 Winter and Spring Poker Classics both held
at Viejas Casino in California—and one chess tournament—Sintra’s 2005 Chess
Open, held in Sintra, Portugal. We chose poker and chess tournaments because
a poker tournament is a luck-based competition whereas a chess tournament is
a skill-based competition.
Before the start of each tournament we distribute a survey to participants
where we ask them, among other things, to provide a point forecast of their rela-
tive performance. We observe the actual rank of each player in the tournament.
When the tournament is over the forecast error of each player is computed and
players are paid according to the quality of their forecasts. We use a quadratic
scoring rule to reward forecast accuracy.
We also ask players to choose between receiving a sure payment and nine
diﬀerent bets whose payments are contingent on relative performance being
above c percent of the population, with c ∈ {10, 20, . . . , 90}. This is a new
measure of beliefs of relative performance, based on the observation of choices
among alternatives, that can be compared with players’ forecasts.
We test for bias in players’ forecasts and bets. We also test if players’
forecasts and bets are significantly diﬀerent from random choices. To perform
these tests we use a parametric approach that takes into account the fact that
incomplete information about relative skill together with the fact that forecasts
are restricted to lie in a bounded interval force players near the low end of the
scale to overestimate relative performance, on average, and players near the high
end to underestimate.
Our findings are described in detail later in the paper. In summary, we find
that players’ forecasts of relative performance are biased : on average, a poker
player overestimates relative performance by 7 to 10 percentiles and a chess
player by 6 to 7 percentiles. Players’ betting behavior is consistent with their
forecasts. In the Spring Poker Classic, 78.6% of players chose bets that pay
when performance is above the median. In Sintra’s Chess Open 63.8% of chess
players chose bets that pay when performance is above median.
Additionally, we find that poker players’ forecasts and bets are not signifi-
1Tournaments are commonly used incentive schemes in organizations. For example, sales-
people are often paid bonuses that depend on their sales relative to those of the other sales-
people in the firm. Most managers are involved in promotion tournaments: vice-presidents
compete to be promoted to president and senior executives compete to become CEO. Elections,
litigation, auctions, athletic contests, and racing games can also be viewed as tournaments.
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cantly diﬀerent from random guesses with an overestimation bias. By contrast,
chess players’ forecasts and bets are significantly better than random choices.
We also find support for the “unskilled and unaware” hypothesis proposed by
Kruger and Dunning (1990). This hypothesis states that the low skilled play-
ers lack the cognitive skills to evaluate their ability and so make worse self-
assessments of skill than the high skilled players. Finally, we find that chess
players’ forecasts of relative performance are not eﬃcient: chess players could
have made better forecasts of relative performance if they had used their knowl-
edge about the quality of the competition to make their forecasts.
This paper is an additional contribution to the literature that documents the
existence of behavioral biases in judgment and decision making. The tendency
that individuals have to overestimate their relative skill was discovered in the
field of social psychology. Two seminal contributions are Dunning et al. (1989)
and Kruger and Dunning (1999) who show that overestimation of relative skill
varies systematically with several factors.2 However, there are limitations with
the psychological evidence. One of them is that individuals are not provided
with incentives to think carefully about their predictions.
There is a growing literature in experimental economics on the causes and
consequences of overestimation of relative skill. Camerer and Lovallo (1999)
investigate the impact of this bias on entry in markets. They consider a market
entry game where subjects’ payoﬀs are based on rank, which is determined either
randomly or through a test of skill. They find that there is more entry when
relative skill determines payoﬀs, which suggests that individuals overestimated
their ability to do well on the test relative to others. They also find that there is
more entry when individuals self-select into the experiment knowing that higher
skill implies higher earnings. They call this finding reference-group neglect.3
Clark and Friesen (2003) study forecasts of relative performance in two tasks:
(1) maximizing a two variable unknown function by moving contiguously from
cell to cell on a spreadsheet and (2) decoding five letter words. Forecast accu-
racy was rewarded with a quadratic scoring rule in 8 sessions and there were no
incentives for accurate forecasts in 4 sessions. Clark and Friesen found overesti-
mation of relative performance in 3 out of 12 sessions, underestimation in 2 out
of 12 sessions, and lack of bias in 7 out of 12 sessions. The use of a quadratic
scoring rule did not reduce either forecast bias or variance over non-incentive
forecasts.
Ferraro (2003) investigates forecasts of relative performance in three intro-
2For example, the more ambiguous is the definition of the skill the greater is the over-
estimation eﬀect, overestimation is higher in tasks that require a greater number of skills,
overestimation decreases with task diﬃculty, and overestimation is higher when individuals
think they can control the outcome of a task than when they think that the outcome of a task
is mostly determined by chance.
3Moore and Cain (2005) use the same experimental design as Camerer and Lovallo (1999)
with the added feature that skill-dependent payoﬀs are based on either an easy or a diﬃcult
test of skill. They found more entry when rank was determined by relative performance on
the easy test than when rank was determined randomly. They found less entry when rank
was determined by relative performance on the diﬃcult test than when rank was determined
randomly.
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ductory microeconomic classes at Georgia State University. Students in these
classes took three non-cumulative multiple-choice exams that made up most
of their final grade. Immediately after completing each exam, subjects were
asked to forecast their relative performance on the exam.4 Ferraro found that
80% of the subjects that took the first exam believed they were above the 50th
percentile. He also found that overestimation of relative performance was not
reduced over time. By the third exam, 83% of all subjects still believed they
performed above the 50th percentile.
Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005), Moore (2002), Moore and Kim (2003) identify
a subject’s beliefs about relative performance by asking the subject whether a
reward should be based on a skill-based test or the outcome of a random device.
There is overestimation of relative performance when more than half of the
subjects prefer to be rewarded on the basis of their performance on the test than
on the basis of a randomization device that selects a winner with probability one
half. The experiments find overestimation on easy tests and underestimation on
hard tests. Monetary payments significantly reduced overestimation of relative
performance but did not improve subjects’ choices.5
The main contribution of this paper is to show that overestimation of rel-
ative skill is present in luck-based (poker) as well as in skill-based (chess) real
world tournaments. The previous studies only considered skill-based tasks. The
paper also shows that the bias can exist even when individuals have very good
information about the relative skill of their competitors (this was the case in
the chess tournament). Previous studies could not address this issue since they
lacked reliable measures of relative skill. This finding is at odds with Camerer
and Lovallo’s reference group neglect explanation for overestimation of relative
skill. On a methodological level, this is the first study to use a statistical test on
the accuracy of players’ forecasts of relative performance that takes into account
the boundness of the dependent variable.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the hypotheses
to be tested. Section 3 explains the experimental design. Section 4 shows that
players’ forecasts are biased. Section 5 discusses forecast accuracy. Section 6
looks at players’ bets. Section 7 shows that the unskilled are unaware of their
skills. Section 8 shows that chess players’ forecasts are not eﬃcient. Section 9
discusses the results. Section 10 concludes the paper. The Appendix contains
the survey used in Sintra’s Chess Open, theoretical results about optimal point
forecasts and bets, and prize structures of tournaments.
4Forecast accuracy was rewarded with a quadratic scoring rule. In one class, subjects who
were closest to predicting their actual percentile received $25 each. In the other two classes,
subjects received $5 if their prediction was within one percentile point accurate, $4 if within
two percentile points and $1 within three percentile points.
5As Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) point out, the drawback of this measure of beliefs of
relative performance is that subjects are facing the choice between a lottery with objective
uncertainty—outcome of the random device—and lottery with subjective uncertainty—the out-
come of the test of skill. Thus, if subjects suﬀer from ambiguity aversion, this measure is likely
to underestimate the subjective perception that subjects have of their relative performance.
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2 Hypotheses
The main hypothesis that will be tested in this field experiment is that players
forecasts of relative performance are rational. By definition, rational forecasts
must be unbiased, that is, there must be no systematic tendency for overesti-
mation or underestimation of relative performance.
H1a Forecasts are unbiased.
We will also use an alternative measure of beliefs of relative performance
to check whether players’ beliefs are biased or not: we let players bet on their
assessments of relative performance. Thus, we also test if players bets are un-
biased.
H1b Players’ bets are unbiased.
We are also interested in having an idea of how accurate players’ forecasts
are. Forecasts may be extremely inaccurate, that is, they may not be distin-
guishable from random guesses. Alternatively, forecasts may be significantly
better than random guesses. The same applies to players’ bets.
H2a Forecasts are not random guesses.
H2b Players’ bets are not random choices.
Kruger and Dunning (1999) report a series of experiments that show that
high skilled individuals make better self-assessments than low skilled individuals.
However, their measure of relative skill is not very good in that it only relies in
a single observation and eﬀects of experience or familiarity with the task are not
taken into account. In Sintra’s chess tournament we have a very good measure
of relative skill, the Elo rating, and we know the number of chess tournaments
that each player has played before. This allows a more stringent test of Kruger
and Dunning’s “unskilled and unaware” hypothesis.
H3 The unskilled are unaware.
By definition, rational forecasts must also be eﬃcient, that is, players must
make use of all available information to make their forecasts. In the experiment
we ask players to provide an assessment of the quality of the competition. This
allows us to test for eﬃciency in players’ forecasts.
H4 Forecasts are eﬃcient.
Hypotheses H1 and H2 are tested in poker and chess tournaments. Hypothe-
ses H3 and H4 are only tested in the chess tournament.
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3 Field Experiment Design
To study the quality of individuals’ forecasts of relative performance in luck-
based tasks we performed the field experiment at two “Texas Hold’em” poker
tournaments held at Viejas Casino in California.6
The first tournament—“Winter Poker Classic”—was held on March, 7th, 2004.
In this tournament there were 155 players each paying a $10 entry fee and
receiving $1500 worth of chips. Once the player used up all chips, he would be
eliminated. The total prize pool was $1670. The second tournament—“Spring
Poker Classic”—was held on May, 23rd, 2004. In this tournament there were 167
players each paying an entry fee of $20. The total prize pool was $3000. The
prize structure of each tournament is depicted in Table A1 in the Appendix.
To obtain players’ forecasts of relative performance we asked them the fol-
lowing question:
Of all the individuals participating in the poker tournament, what percentage
do you think will be eliminated before you?
Players were instructed to answer the question by choosing a whole number
between 0 and 99. The survey also informed players that numbers close to
zero indicate that they predict that they will be among worst players in the
tournament, and that numbers close to 99 indicate that they predict that they
will be among the best players in the tournament.
Sintra’s Chess Open was held in July, 17th, 2005 in Sintra, a village near
Lisbon. There were 93 chess players in the tournament. The entry fee for mem-
bers of Sintra’s Chess Club was 3 euros while non-members had to pay 6 euros.
The total prize pool was 1100 euros. The prize structure of the tournament is
depicted in Table A2 in the Appendix.
Sintra’s Chess Open used the Swiss system. At the start of the tournament
players with similar Elo ratings were matched in pairs.7 After the first round,
players were placed in groups according to their score (winners in the 1 group,
those who drew go in the 1/2 group, and losers go in the 0 group) and then
6 In “Texas Hold’em” tournaments luck plays a large role in determining players’ positions.
In Texas Hold’em poker each player gets two cards face down, to be combined with five
community cards dealt face up in the middle - the first three simultaneously (called the flop),
then a fourth (the turn), then a fifth (the river) - to make the best five-card hand. At the
start of the tournament high ability players with weak hands can be eliminated by low ability
players with stronger hands. This happens because at the start of the tournament players’
earnings are very similar and a high ability player is sometimes forced to bet against a low
ability player that has a stronger hand. As the tournament evolves the role of luck becomes
less important since the earnings of the high ability players become increasingly larger than
the earnings of the low ability players.
7The Elo rating system in chess is a means of comparing the relative strengths of chess
players, devised by Arpad Elo. Players gain or lose rating points depending on the Elo rating
of their opponents. If a player wins a game of chess in a rated tournament, they gain a
number of rating points that increases in proportion to the diﬀerence between their rating
and their opponent’s rating. The central statistical assumption of the ELO system is that
any player’s tournament performances, spread over a long enough career, will follow a normal
distribution. A detailed description of the formulae and theory behind the system can be
found at http://home.clear.net.nz/pages/petanque/ratings/descript.htm.
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matched in pairs inside each group. Each round the same procedure was used.
There were a total of 8 rounds each lasting 20 minutes. The relative performance
of each chess player in the tournament was calculated by the organization using
the Swiss method.8
Like in poker tournaments, we asked players in Sintra’s Chess Open to pre-
dict their relative performance. The main novelty is that we asked chess players
to report their own Elo rating, a very informative measure of relative skill at
chess. We also asked chess players to report the percentage of players in the
tournament with a smaller Elo rating. This gives us an idea of players’ infor-
mation about the quality of the competition.
Based on each player’s forecast of relative performance and his actual per-
formance, we calculated the forecast error of each player, Ei, defined as Ei =
Fi−Pi, where Fi is player i’s forecast of relative performance and Pi is player i’s
relative performance, with Fi being an integer between 0 and 99 and Pi being
a real number in [0, 100). The reward of player i, Ri, as a function of player i’s
forecast error, was determined by the quadratic scoring rule
Ri =
½
$M − [Int (|Ei|)]2 , if Int (|Ei|) ≤ X
$0 , if Int (|Ei|) > X ,
where Int (x) is the closest integer which is smaller than x. In the Winter Poker
ClassicM = $10 and X = $4, in the Spring Poker ClassicM = $20 and X = $5,
and in Sintra’s Chess Open M = 10 and X = 4 euro.9
We chose the quadratic scoring rule because of its simplicity and the fact
that it allows us to test the rationality of players’ forecasts using ordinary least
squares regressions. DeGroot (1970) shows that the quadratic scoring rule is
incentive compatible for a risk neutral player. Propositions 1 and 2 in the
Appendix show that the quadratic scoring rule is also incentive compatible for
a player with uniform or an unimodal and symmetric distribution of beliefs,
regardless of the player’s preferences towards risk.10
We did not use a binary lottery payoﬀ scheme to induce risk neutrality from
the part of players due to the lack of control associated with performing a field
experiment. Most players left the room where the tournament was being held
immediately after being eliminated so there was no way they could observe the
lottery being drawn.11
8A detailed description of Swiss system can be found at http://scichess.org/faq/swiss.html
9 It is not clear whether using monetary incentives improves individuals’ forecasts. For a
good discussion of this topic see Camerer and Hogarth (1999).
10Alternatively, we could have chosen a scoring rule where the loss is proportional to the
absolute value of the forecast error. De Groot (1970) shows that this scoring rule induces risk
neutral players to report the median rather than the mean. To test the rationality of players’
forecasts under this alternative scoring rule we would need to use least absolute deviations
regressions—see Basu and Markov (2003). Camerer (1982) uses a scoring rule where individuals
are paid something when they are exactly correct and nothing otherwise. This rule induces
risk neutral players to report the mode rather than the mean.
11 It is not clear that this procedure works in practice. For example, Selten et al. (1999) find
that the binary lottery payoﬀ scheme does not induce risk neutrality, but on the contrary, it
leads to stronger deviations from risk neutrality than a direct money payoﬀ scheme.
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The survey also asked players for demographic characteristics such as age,
sex, and academic major. On average, players took 10 minutes to read, answer,
and return the survey. Each player filled his survey individually and returned
it to us right after he finished it. The reply rate in the Winter Poker Classic
was 79%, the one in the Spring Poker Classic was 70% and the one in Sintra’s
Chess Open was 65%.
In the Winter and Spring Poker Classics players were asked for their ad-
dresses and their earnings from taking the survey were sent by mail. In Sintra’s
Chess Open players had the option of receiving their earnings by mail or at the
end of the tournament. Most players chose to receive them at the end of the
tournament.
4 Forecast Bias
Table I displays the distribution of forecasts in each tournament divided into
intervals of 10 percentiles starting in the interval [0, 10] and ending in [90, 99].
Table I
Distribution of Players’ Forecasts in Tournaments
Winter Poker Classic Spring Poker Classic Sintra’s Chess Open
Forecasts Players Share Players Share Players Share
[0, 9] 1 0.7 1 0.8 6 10.0
[10, 19] 6 4.4 5 3.9 4 6.7
[20, 29] 11 8.2 19 14.6 5 8.3
[30, 39] 8 5.9 5 3.9 3 5.0
[40, 49] 9 6.7 13 10.1 5 8.3
[50, 59] 19 14.1 17 13.2 5 8.3
[60, 69] 20 14.8 17 13.2 10 16.7
[70, 79] 14 10.4 16 12.4 3 5.0
[80, 89] 22 16.3 16 12.4 11 18.3
[90, 99] 25 18.5 20 15.5 8 13.3
Total 135 100.0 129 100.0 60 100.0
Inspection of Table I reveals a clear tendency for overestimation of relative
performance in all tournaments. We have that 74.1%, 66.7% (poker) and 61.6%
(chess) of players who took the survey forecast to finish at or above the median.
To test if players’ forecasts of relative performance are unbiased, hypothesis
H1a, we run the ordinary least squares regression Ei = α + εi, where Ei is
the forecast error of player i and α is the intercept.12 The results for each
tournament are summarized in Table II.
12This is a standard test of unbiasedness in forecasts.
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Table II
OLS Regression Results for Forecast Bias
Winter Poker Classic Spring Poker Classic Sintra’s Chess Open
Intercept 10.02 (3.02)*** 7.13 (2.03)** 6.98 (2.31)**
n=122 n=116 n=60
Dependent variable: Forecast error
t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
We see that the mean forecast error in the Winter Poker Classic is equal to
10.02 percentiles, the mean forecast error in the Spring Poker Classic is 7.13
percentiles and 6.98 percentiles in Sintra’s Chess Open. The mean forecast
errors in all tournaments are greater than zero at 5% significance level. This
shows that, on average, players’ forecasts in all tournaments are biased towards
overestimation of relative performance.
Are the mean forecast errors obtained for our three samples representative
of the populations? We think that the answer to this question is yes. First,
we have forecast errors for a large majority of the population in both poker
tournaments (79% and 70%). Second, in the Winter Poker Classic the players
whose order of elimination was not monitored are among the worst performers in
the tournament and these are the ones who overestimate relative performance
the most. So, the sample mean forecast error in the Winter Poker Classic is
a lower bound of the mean forecast error of the population. Third, the mean
performance of 28 players in Spring Poker Classic who did not answer the survey
but whose order of elimination was monitored is similar to the mean performance
of the 116 players who forecasted their position. This makes us believe that the
sample mean forecast error in the Spring Poker Classic is representative of the
mean forecast error of the population.
What about the level of bias of the whole population in Sintra’s Chess Open?
Does it diﬀer significantly from 7 percentiles? In this tournament we have
forecast errors for 65% of the population. However, since we now have the
relative performance of all players in the tournament we can back out the missing
forecasts of the 33 players from their relative performance.13 Doing that we find
that the mean forecast of relative performance of the population would be equal
to 55.42 percentiles. Since the mean relative performance of the population is
equal to 49.47, the mean forecast error would be equal to 6 percentiles.
13To do that we run the ordinary least squares regression Zi = a + bUi + εi, where Zi
and Ui are the logit transformations of player i’s relative performance and forecast of relative
performance, respectively. We obtain
Zˆi = 0.29
(1.49)
+ 0.77
(6.06)
Ui.
We use the estimated coeﬃcients to back up the transformed forecasts of the 33 players from
their relative performance. After that we invert the transformation to find the value of the
forecasts, that is, we calculate Fˆi = 100eZˆi/
³
1 + eZˆi
´
for each of the 33 players.
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5 Forecast Accuracy
The mean absolute forecast error in the Winter Poker Classic was 29.66 per-
centiles and 31.34 percentiles in the Spring Poker Classic. Such large mean
absolute forecast errors suggest that poker players forecasts of relative perfor-
mance are very inaccurate. By contrast, the mean absolute forecast error of
these 60 chess players is 17.03 percentiles.
To test if players’ forecasts of relative performance are not random guesses,
hypothesis H2a, we need to have an idea of how well players’ forecasts predict
relative performance. One way to do that is to run the ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression
Pi = α+ βFi + εi, (1)
where Fi is player i’s forecast and Pi is player i’s position in the tournament. If
we find that the fit of this regression is good and that the estimate for the slope
is significantly greater than zero, then there is evidence that players forecasts
are not random guesses. By contrast, if we find that the fit of this regression is
bad and that the estimate for the slope is not significantly diﬀerent from zero,
then players’ forecasts are not distinguishable from random guesses.
However, the OLS estimates in (1) would be biased.14 Incomplete infor-
mation about relative skill together with the fact that relative performance is
restricted to lie in a bounded interval force people near the low end of the scale
to overestimate relative performance, on average, and people near the high end
to underestimate.
To address this problem we use the transformation of variables technique.
One way to map the variable Pi, which is bounded by 0 and 100, to the real line
is to use a logit transformation. The logit transformation of player i’s relative
performance is given by Ui = ln (Pi/(100− Pi)) ,and the logit transformation of
player i’s forecast of relative performance is given by Zi = ln (Fi/(100− Fi)) .
The transformation implies Ui and Zi are unconstrained variables.15 We use the
transformed series to run the ordinary least squares regression Ui = α+βZi+εi.
Table III displays the results obtained for each tournament.
14This happens because the dependent variable is bounded by 0 and 100. The nature of the
bias can be demonstrated as follows. If 0 ≤ Pi ≤ 100, then −α− βFi ≤ εi ≤ 100− α− βFi.
Thus, the fact that we have a limited dependent variable implies that the error term is
regulated by an upper and a lower bound that depends on the independent variable. So,
the distribution of the error term depends on the value of the independent variable and it is
not identically distributed. OLS requires, among other things, that the error term is identically
distributed and uncorrelated with the regressor.
15 See Zarembka (1974) on the transformation of variables technique. This transformation
of variables has also been used by Chen and Giovannini (1992) for testing the rationality of
exchange rate forecasts within a band.
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Table III
OLS Regression Results for Forecast Accuracy
Winter Poker Classic Spring Poker Classic Sintra’s Chess Open
Constant 0.14 (0.75) 0.01 (0.03) -0.22 (-1.04)
Forecast 0.03 (0.34) 0.11 (0.89) 0.50 (6.07)***
n=122, R2=0.001 n=116, R2=0.007 n=60, R2=0.39
Dependent variable: Logit transformation of relative performance
t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
We see from Table III that the fit of Winter and Spring Poker Classic regres-
sions is very bad: the R-squared is equal to 0.1% in the Winter Poker Classic
and 0.7% in the Spring Poker Classic. We also see that in both poker tour-
naments the estimated coeﬃcients are not significantly diﬀerent from zero.16
Thus, we find evidence against hypothesis H2a for poker tournaments, that is,
poker players’ forecasts in both tournaments are random guesses. By contrast,
we see from Table III that the fit of the Sintra’s Chess Open regression is 39%.
The estimated coeﬃcient for the slope is 0.5 and is significantly diﬀerent from
zero at 1% significance level. Thus, we find evidence that supports hypothesis
H2a for Sintra’s Chess Open: chess players’ forecasts of relative performance
are not random guesses.17
6 Betting Behavior
In the Spring Poker Classic and in Sintra’s Chess Open players were also asked
to choose among diﬀerent bets whose payments depended on their relative per-
formance in the tournament. For example, in the Spring Poker Classic each
player was oﬀered the choice of getting a sure payment of $2.00 or betting
on his relative performance. There were nine possible bets whose payments
were contingent and a player being above c percent of the population, with
c ∈ {0, 10, 20, . . . , 90}. The bets paid $200/(100− c) if a player was eliminated
after c percent of the population and zero dollars otherwise.
Proposition 3 in the Appendix shows that for risk neutral players, the choice
of bet question is a more stringent test of overestimation of relative performance
than the point forecast question. In the forecasting problem, a risk neutral
player who overestimates or underestimates relative performance by the same
16Another aspect that needs to be taken into consideration is that players who forecast their
performance to be in the bottom of the scale may make larger forecast errors than players
who forecast their performance to be in the top of the scale (the transformation of variables
may or may not change this pattern of heteroescedasticity). If there is heteroescedasticity in
the transformed model, then the OLS estimates are unbiased but ineﬃcient. To address this
possibility we run a robust regression using Stata 7.0. We found that the robust standard
errors are essentially identical to the OLS standard errors.
17The lack of accuracy of poker players’ forecasts in both tournaments implied that the
earnings from their forecasts were quite low as it can be seen in Table A3 in the Appendix.
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amount faces the same loss. By contrast, in the betting problem, a risk neutral
player who overestimates relative performance by 10% incurs a larger loss than
if he underestimates it by 10%. Thus, the optimal bet of a risk neutral player
should be smaller than his optimal point forecast.
The answers to the choice of bet question in each tournament are summarized
in Table IV.18
Table IV
Players’ Choices and Earnings from Bets
Spring Poker Classic Sintra’s Chess Open
Reward Paid Share Reward Paid Share
$2.00 14/14 10.0 1.00 euro 8/8 13.8
$2.22 1/1 0.7 1.11 euro 6/7 12.1
$2.50 2/4 2.9 1.25 euro 3/4 6.9
$2.86 3/6 4.3 1.43 euro 1/1 1.7
$3.33 3/5 3.5 1.67 euro 0/1 1.7
$4.00 7/17 12.2 2.00 euro 7/10 17.2
$5.00 8/18 12.9 2.50 euro 0/4 6.9
$6.66 0/3 2.1 3.33 euro 2/3 5.2
$10.00 4/24 17.2 5.00 euro 5/13 22.4
$20.00 6/48 34.4 10.00 euro 3/7 12.1
Rewards $281.79 Rewards 95.5 euro
Players 140 Players 58
Average $2.01 Average 1.65 euro
A quick inspection of Table IV shows us that 78.6% of players who answered
the choice of bet question in the Spring Poker Classic and 63.8% of players who
did it in Sintra’s Chess Open chose bets that paid them when their performance
was above the median. Thus, players choices of bet seem to be consistent with
their forecasts of relative performance in that they also reveal overestimation of
relative performance.
To test if poker players’ bets are unbiased, hypothesis H1b, we need to
compare poker players’ bets to their ranks in the Spring Poker Classic. Ranking
bets from 5 (the sure thing ), 15 (the $2.22 bet), to 95 (the $20 bet) we find
that the average choice of bet of poker players is 68.33. The average rank is
the 51.54th percentile. The t statistic for the hypothesis test that the average
choice of bet is not significantly diﬀerent from 51.54 is equal to 6.56 and the
critical value, at 5% significance level, is equal to t5%(139) ' 1.645. Thus,
we find evidence against hypothesis H1b, that is, we find that poker players’
bets are biased towards overestimation of relative performance. Using a similar
18The first column of Table IV reports the payoﬀ of each bet, the second column the ratio of
the number of players that were paid for that choice of bet to the number of players who chose
that bet, and the third column reports the share of players in the Spring Poker Classic who
chose each bet. The remaining three colums provide similar information for Sintra’s Chess
Open.
12
procedure we also find that chess players’ bets are biased towards overestimation
of relative performance.19
Table IV also shows us that the average reward for choice of bet of poker
players is $2.01. This value is not diﬀerent, at 5% significance level, from the
expected reward of a random choice of bet in the Spring Poker Classic: $2.00.
Thus, we find evidence against hypothesis H2b, that is, we find that poker
players’ bets are random choices. By contrast, the average reward for choice of
bet of chess players is $1.65. This value is greater, at 5% significance level, than
the average reward of a random choice of bet in Sintra’s Chess Open: 1 euro.
Thus, we find evidence in favor of hypothesis H2b, that is, that chess players’
bets are not random choices.
We see that poker players’ bets are consistent with their point forecasts in
that they also reveal overestimation of relative performance and lack of accuracy.
If anything, poker players’ betting behavior seems to reveal more overestimation
of relative performance than their forecasting behavior. In eﬀect, while 78.6% of
players chose bets that paid them when their performance was above the median
only 62.8% of players forecasted that their performance would be above median.
However, since we did not assess players’ preferences towards risk we cannot
claim that poker players reveal more overestimation of relative performance in
their bets than in their point forecasts.
Chess players’ bets are also consistent with their point forecasts in that they
also reveal overestimation of relative performance and are better than random
choices. However, the tendency towards overestimation of relative performance
in chess players’ betting behavior is only statistically significant at 10% level
whereas chess players’ forecasts reveal overestimation of relative performance at
5% significance level.
7 Unskilled and Unaware
Kruger and Dunning (1999) report a series of experiments with easy skill-based
tasks that support the “unskilled-unaware hypothesis”, that is, that the high
skilled individuals are better informed about their skills than low skilled indi-
viduals. One possible explanation for this finding is that high skilled players are
more experienced than low skilled players and that greater experience implies
better information about relative skill.20
To test Kruger and Dunning’s “unskilled-unaware hypothesis” we use data
from Sintra’s Chess Open. In this tournament we have a very informative
measure of relative skill, a player’s Elo rating, and we have asked players for
19Ranking bets from 5 (the sure thing ), 15 (the $1.11 bet), to 95 (the $10 bet) we find that
the average choice of bet of chess players is 53.42. The average rank is the 47.61th percentile.
The t statistic for the hypothesis test that the average choice of bet is not significantly dif-
ferent from 47.61 is equal to 1.35 and the critical value, at 10% significance level, is equal to
t10%(57) ' 1.28.
20However, Burson et al. (2006) show that for diﬃcult skill-based tasks (where there is
underestimation of relative performance) the low skilled players are more accurate in their
forecasts than the high skilled players.
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their previous experience with chess tournaments. This means we can study the
impact of relative skill on the accuracy of chess players’ forecasts while taking
into account experience eﬀects. To do that we run the OLS regression
|Ei| = a+ b1Expi + b2Eloi + b3(Eloi ×Expi) + εi.
The results obtained for this regression are reported in Table V.
Table V
OLS Regression Results for Forecast Accuracy,
Experience and Elo in Sintra’s Chess Open
Constant 27.05 (6.97)***
Experience 0.21 (1.87)*
Elo -32.67 (-3.79)***
Exp×Elo -0.20 (1.77)*
n=49, R2=0.28
Dependent variable: Absolute forecast error
t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Table V shows that experience improves forecasts, but the coeﬃcient is only
statistically diﬀerent from zero at 10% significance level . However, the coeﬃ-
cient for relative skill is negative and significant at 1% significance level. That
is, the data shows that high skilled chess players make smaller forecast errors
than low skilled chess players. Thus we find support for Kruger and Dunning’s
(1999) “unskilled-unaware hypothesis” and this can not be explained by the fact
that high skilled players are more experienced in chess tournaments than low
skilled players.
8 Eﬃciency of Forecasts
For chess players’ forecasts of relative performance to be rational they would
have to be unbiased and eﬃcient. We already know that chess players’ fore-
casts are biased. Can we say anything about eﬃciency? If a chess player makes
an eﬃcient forecast of relative performance then he must use all the available
information that he has about his relative skill to make that forecast. Since
we asked players to provide their best estimate of the percentage of the pop-
ulation in the tournament with a lower Elo rating we can use this variable to
test for eﬃciency in chess’ players forecasts—hypothesis H4.21 To do that we
run the ordinary least squares regression Ui = α + β1Zi + β2Wi + εi, where
Wi = ln (Leloi/(100− Leloi)) , with Leloi being player i’s assessment of the
21The Elo ratings of all players were posted at the entrance of the room where the tourna-
ment took place.
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percentage of the population that has a lower Elo rating. If chess players’ fore-
casts are eﬃcient we expect that β2 is not significantly diﬀerent from zero. By
contrast, if β2 is significantly diﬀerent from zero, then there is evidence that
chess players’ forecasts are not eﬃcient. The results obtained for this regression
are displayed in Table VI.
Table VI
OLS Regression Results for Test of Eﬃciency of
Players’ Forecasts in Sintra’s Chess Open
Regression 1 Regression 2
Constant -0.07 (-0.48) Constant 0.14 (0.90)
Forecast 0.60 (7.07)*** Forecast 0.35 (3.13)***
Lower Elo 0.24 (3.15)***
n=44 n=44
R2=0.54 R2=0.63
Adjusted R2= 0.53 Adjusted R2= 0.62
Dependent variable: Logit transf. of relative performance
t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes statistical
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
The results from the two regressions in Table VI show us that chess players’
forecasts are not eﬃcient. The model with the explanatory variable Lower Elo
(regression 2) has a better fit than the model without it (regression 1). In
other words, chess players could have made better forecasts if they had taken
into consideration their own subjective assessments of the percentage of the
population with a smaller Elo rating.22
9 Discussion of Findings
9.1 Bias and Rationality
The paper finds that both poker and chess players’ forecasts of relative perfor-
mance fail the rationality test: they are biased towards overestimation of relative
performance. The fact that luck plays almost no role in chess and that most
players in Sintra’s Chess Open have plenty of information about their relative
skill made us expect that chess players’ forecasts would be unbiased. However,
that was not the case.
This finding can be interpreted from two diﬀerent perspectives. From the
perspective of advocates of rational expectations the bias in chess players’ fore-
casts of relative performance is small and so we should not worry about it. By
contrast, from the perspective of advocates of motivational and cognitive biases
22Players subjective assessments of the percentage of the population with a smaller Elo
rating where very good when compared to actual Elo ratings.
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in human judgment, the fact that the bias persists when there is plenty of infor-
mation about the quality of the competition constitutes strong evidence against
rational expectations. Moreover, since in most tasks it is hard to find measures
of relative performance as informative as the Elo rating is for chess, advocates
of motivational and cognitive biases, would argue that biases in judgments of
relative performance are likely to be widespread.
Why did poker and chess players overestimate their relative performance?
There are at least four alternative explanations for this bias in the economics’
literature. According to the reference group neglect explanation proposed by
Camerer and Lovallo (1999) individuals overestimate their relative skill because
they are not aware that the people who chose to participate in the tournament
are more skilled than a random person. The bias may also be due to a positive
correlation between risk preferences and skill. If low skilled players are risk
averse and high skilled players are risk seeking, then forecasts may be biased
towards the positive side even though there is no overestimation of relative per-
formance. Another possibility is that the bias results from individuals’ tendency
to attribute failure to bad luck and success to skill.23 Finally, Santos-Pinto and
Sobel (2005) show that skill investment and egocentric comparisons can lead
individuals to overestimate their relative skill.
We could not test these diﬀerent explanations with our field experiment.
However, the finding that chess players’ forecasts are ineﬃcient is at odds with
Camerer and Lovallo’s (1999) reference group neglect explanation. In Sintra’s
Chess Open players had very good information about the quality of their com-
petitors but their forecasts did not incorporate fully that information.
Another question that might be raised is: why is the overestimation bias
larger in poker than in chess? One explanation for this finding may be a selection
eﬀect due to the diﬀerent nature of the poker and chess tournaments in this
experiment. Suppose that individuals are attracted to tournaments not only
for the utility they can get from the money they win net of the entry fee but
also from the utility from playing. In both cases, players who overestimate their
skills the most are the one that are more likely to enter. However, playing in a
chess tournament without winning a prize may be more satisfying than leaving
a poker tournament early without prize. This could lead to a smaller selection
eﬀect in chess tournaments.
9.2 Skill versus Luck
The paper shows that overestimation of relative performance is present in both
poker and chess tournaments. Clearly, luck plays a large role in the game of
poker and only a small role in the game of chess. According to the psychology
literature individuals are more overconfident when they think that they have
control over the outcome of the task. However, the overestimation bias that we
found in poker tournaments was larger than the one that we found in chess. Do
23This explanation is called the self-serving bias in causal attributions and it was first
formalized by Gervais and Odean (2001). Van den Steen (2004) shows how the self-serving
bias may preclude learning.
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the findings in this paper stand in contradiction with the psychology evidence?
Not necessarily.
It could be that poker players perceive the poker tournament as being more
of a skill-based task than a luck-based task. In fact, we found some support for
this possibility. We asked players in the survey how they thought their position
in the tournament would be determined. Players could chose among seven
options that ranged from “Only by relative skill” to “Only by luck” with 5 other
options in between. On average, players thought that skill is more important
than luck but that luck plays a large role in determining relative performance.
9.3 Accuracy and Information about Competitors
One of the main diﬀerences between the poker and chess tournaments in this
experiment is that chess players have information about the distribution of skills
of their opponents whereas poker players do not. The diﬀerence in information
sets together with the fact that relative performance is much more random at
poker than at chess are likely to explain the fact that poker players’ forecast
errors are so much larger than those of chess players.
9.4 Monetary Incentives and Bias
There is at least one serious limitation to our measures of beliefs of relative
performance. As Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) show, monetary incentives can
reduce overestimation of relative performance (but they do not improve accu-
racy). We provided modest monetary incentives to players for making accurate
forecasts and bets. If a player’s beliefs of relative performance are very spread
out, then his expected rewards from taking the survey are small and do not
depend much on his forecasts or bets. On the other hand, if the distribution of
a player’s beliefs of relative performance is tight, then the impact of monetary
incentives is larger. We cannot rule out the possibility that the overestimation
bias would disappear if players would have been given larger monetary incen-
tives.
10 Conclusion
This paper shows that players in three real world tournaments tend to over-
estimate relative performance. The bias is present in both luck-based (poker)
as well as in skill-based (chess) tournaments. This happens in the presence of
financial incentives for accurate forecasts and even when players have very good
information about their relative skill. We also find that players are willing to
bet on their overly favorable views of relative performance. However, the degree
of overestimation that we find is not as large as the ones often reported in the
social psychology literature. In poker tournaments the average player overesti-
mates his relative performance by 7 to 10 percentiles. In chess tournaments the
average player overestimates relative performance by 6 to 7 percentiles.
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11 Appendices
11.1 Sintra’s 2005 Chess Open Survey
You are about to answer a survey that, among other things, asks you to make a
prediction of your relative position in this chess tournament. Depending upon
how well you make your prediction you may be able to earn up to 10 (Question
1). The survey also asks you to choose between diﬀerent lotteries whose prizes
depend on your relative position in the tournament (Question 3) or on the draw
of a random number (Question 10). Depending on your choice of lottery, how
well you perform in the tournament, and the draw of the random number you
may earn up to an additional 20. We will send you your payment by mail if you
provide us your name and address. If you prefer, you can provide us only your
e-mail address and we will tell you your payment by e-mail and then you can
give us your address if you wish to receive it by mail. This survey is confidential.
Name:_____________________E-mail:________________
Address:________________________________________
Zip code:___________________Age:_________ Sex:______
Q1: Please read the following question carefully: Of all the individuals partic-
ipating in this chess tournament what percentage do you think will be ranked
below you?
Before you answer note that, after the tournament is over, we will compare your
prediction with the ratio of the actual number of players ranked below you to
the total number of players. We will then pay you for your prediction as follows:
10 if the prediction is less than 1% away from your position;
9 if the prediction is more than 1% and less than 2% away from your position;
6 if the prediction is more than 2% and less than 3% away from your position;
1 if the prediction is more than 3% and less than 4% away from your position;
0 otherwise.
Now, answer the question by choosing a whole number between 0 and 99 (recall
that the number you choose represents your best estimate of what percentage
of people will be ranked below you. Numbers close to zero indicate that you
predict that you will be among worst players in the tournament, numbers close
to 99 indicate that you predict that you will be among the best players in the
tournament).
Q2: Consider the 10 lotteries below, whose prizes depend on your ranking in
the tournament. Choose one of the options:
We pay you 1.00 for sure
We pay you 1.11 if at least 10% of players are ranked below you and 0 otherwise
We pay you 1.25 if at least 20% of players are ranked below you and 0 otherwise
We pay you 1.43 if at least 30% of players are ranked below you and 0 otherwise
We pay you 1.67 if at least 40% of players are ranked below you and 0 otherwise
We pay you 2.00 if at least 50% of players are ranked below you and 0 otherwise
We pay you 2.50 if at least 60% of players are ranked below you and 0 otherwise
We pay you 3.33 if at least 70% of players are ranked below you and 0 otherwise
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We pay you 5.00 if at least 80% of players are ranked below you and 0 otherwise
We pay you 10.00 if at least 90% of players are ranked below you and 0 otherwise
Q3: What is your Elo rating? If you don’t know the answer to this question,
then choose between: a) I don’t have an Elo rating or b) I have an Elo rating
but I can’t recall it.
Q4: What is your best estimate of the percentage of players in this tournament
who have an Elo rating less than yours?
Q5: How many chess tournaments have you played before? Consider that a
chess tournament involves monetary prizes and at least 20 players.
Q6: How do you think your position in this tournament will be determined?
Choose one
Only by your relative skill at playing chess
More by your relative skill than by luck, and luck plays a small role
More by your relative skill than by luck, and luck plays a large role
As much by your relative skill as by luck
More by luck than by your relative skill, and relative skill plays a large role
More by luck than by your relative skill, and relative skill plays a small role
Only by luck
11.2 Forecasting Problem
Suppose that an individual’s beliefs of relative performance are a continuous
random variable X. Let beliefs have density g (x) , continuous and with support
in [a, b], with 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1. Suppose this individual has initial wealth w¯ and
utility of wealth U(w). Let f represent the individual’s point forecast, with f ∈
[0, 1] . This individual’s wealth—a continuous version of the discrete quadratic
scoring rule—is given by w = w¯ +
£
w0 − (x− f)2
¤
, with w0 ≥ 1. The optimal
point forecast of this individual is given by
max
f∈[0,1]
bZ
a
U(w¯ + w0 − (x− f)2)g(x)dx. (2)
We will call (2) the point forecast problem. The first-order condition to (2) is
given by
bZ
a
U 0(w¯ + w0 − (x− f∗)2)2(x− f∗)g(x)dx = 0.
and the second-order condition by
bZ
a
£
U 00(w¯ + w0 − (x− f∗)2)2(x− f∗)2 − U 0(w¯ + w0 − (x− f∗)2)
¤
g(x)dx < 0.
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If an individual is risk averse we have U 0 > 0 and U 00 < 0 and the second-order
condition is verified. If an individual is risk neutral we have U 0 > 0 and U 00 = 0
and the second-order condition is also satisfied. If an individual is risk seeking
we have U 0 > 0 and U 00 > 0 and we can’t tell if the second-order condition is
satisfied or not.
It is a well known result that optimal point forecast of a risk neutral individ-
ual is his mean belief of relative performance.24 Proposition 1 shows that the
optimal point forecast of an individual with uniform beliefs of relative perfor-
mance is his mean belief of relative performance, regardless of his preferences
towards risk.
Proposition 1 If an individual’s beliefs of relative performance have the uni-
form distribution with support [a, b], with 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1, then f∗ = E(X).
Proof. Using integration by parts, the first-order condition to the point forecast
problem is equivalent to
U(w¯ + w0 − (b− f∗)2)g(b)− U(w¯ + w0 − (a− f∗)2)g(a) =
bZ
a
U(w¯ + w0 − (x− f∗)2)g0(x)dx.
If beliefs have the uniform distribution, then g0(x) = 0 for all x and g(a) = g(b),
so the above condition reduces to U(w¯ + w0 − (b − f∗)2) = U(w¯ + w0 − (a −
f∗)2), or f∗ = (a + b)/2 = E(X),that is, the optimal point forecast of an
individual with uniform beliefs of relative performance is his mean belief of
relative performance. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 shows that the optimal point forecast of an individual with
unimodal and symmetric beliefs of relative performance is his mean belief of
relative performance, regardless of his preferences towards risk.
Proposition 2 If an individual’s beliefs of relative performance are unimodal
and symmetric, then f∗ = E(X)
Proof. Let the distribution of beliefs have support in [a, b]. Using integration
by parts, the first-order condition to the point forecast problem is equivalent to
U(w¯ + w0 − (b− f∗)2)g(b)− U(w¯ + w0 − (a− f∗)2)g(a) =
bZ
a
U(w¯ + w0 − (x− f∗)2)g0(x)dx.
24 See DeGroot (1970) pp. 228.
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or,
U(w¯ + w0 − (a− f∗)2)g(a) +
E(X)Z
a
U(w¯ + w0 − (x− f∗)2)g0(x)dx =
U(w¯ + w0 − (b− f∗)2)g(b) +
bZ
E(X)
U(w¯ + w0 − (x− f∗)2)(−g0(x))dx.
If a ≤ f∗ < E(X) and g is symmetric and unimodal, then the first term in the
LHS is greater than the first term in the RHS and the value of the integral in the
LHS is greater than the value of integral in the RHS. But then the value of the
LHS is greater than the value of the RHS, a contradiction. If E(X) < f∗ ≤ b
and g is symmetric and unimodal, the first term in the LHS is smaller than the
first term on the RHS and the value of the integral in the LHS is smaller than the
value of integral in the RHS. But then the value of the LHS is smaller than the
value of the RHS, a contradiction. Thus, it must be that f∗ = E(X). Q.E.D.
11.3 Betting Problem
Suppose that an individual has beliefs of relative performance given by the
density g (x) , with support in [a, b], with 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1. Suppose this individual
has initial wealth w¯ and utility of wealth given by U(w). Let c represent the
choice of bet, with c ∈ [0, 1] . This individual’s wealth—a continuous version of
our discrete bets choice—is given by
w =
½
w¯ + w01−c , x ≥ c
w¯, x < c
,
with w0 ≥ 1. The optimal bet of this individual is the solution to
max
c∈[0,1]
G(c)U(w¯) + [1−G(c)]U
µ
w¯ +
w0
1− c
¶
. (3)
We will call (3) the betting problem. We can state the following result.
Proposition 3 If an individual is risk neutral and his beliefs of relative per-
formance are
(i) uniform with support [a, 1], with 0 ≤ a, then his optimal bet is any c∗ ∈ [a, 1];
(ii) uniform with support [a, b] with 0 ≤ a < b < 1 then c∗ = a < E(X) = f∗;
(iii) unimodal and symmetric, then a < c∗ < Mode(X) = E(X) = f∗;
(iv) unimodal and positively skewed, then a ≤ c∗ ≤Mode(X) < E(X) = f∗.
Proof : Let start by proving (i). If an individual is risk neutral and has uniform
beliefs with support in [a, 1] then the objective function of the betting problem
is w¯ + w0/(1− a). Since this individual’s utility does not depend on his choice
of bet he must be indiﬀerent between any bet in [a, 1].
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Let us show (ii). If an individual is risk neutral and has uniform beliefs with
support in [a, b] with 0 ≤ a < b < 1, then the objective function problem of the
betting problem is w¯ + b−cb−a
w0
1−c . It is clear that for this case the optimal bet is
c∗ = a.
Let us show (iii). If an individual is risk neutral and has unimodal and sym-
metric beliefs, then the first-order condition to the betting problem becomes
−g(c∗) w01−c∗ +[1−G(c∗)]
w0
(1−c∗)2 = 0 or 1−G(c∗) = g(c∗)(1− c∗). This is equiv-
alent to Z 1
c∗
g(x)dx =
Z 1
c∗
g(c∗)dx. (4)
If we can show there exists an x0 strictly greater than c∗ such that g(c∗) < g(x0)
then it must be that c∗ < Mode(X) since Mode(X) = max g(x). Suppose, by
contradiction that: (1) for all x > c∗ we have g(x) ≤ g(c∗) and (2) that there
exists an x0 > c∗ such that g(x0) ≤ g(c∗). By the well know result that one
can integrate inequalities, assumptions (1) and (2) imply that
R 1
c∗ g(x)dx <R 1
c∗ g(c
∗)dx, which contradicts (4). Thus, we must either have that (a) g(x) =
g(c∗) for x ≥ c∗, or (b) there exists an x0 > c∗ such that g(c∗) < g(x0). Case (a)
is a degenerate case. If case (b) holds then we know that c∗ < Mode(X). So, for a
unimodal and symmetric density of beliefs we have that c∗ < Mode(X) = E(X).
To finish the proof we still need to show that the second-order condition to the
betting problem is satisfied. This condition is given by
−g0(c∗) w0
1− c∗ − 2g(c
∗)
w0
(1− c∗)2 + 2 [1−G(c
∗)]
w0
(1− c∗)3 ,
which simplifies to −g0(c∗) w01−c∗ . We see that the second-order condition is sat-
isfied whenever g0(c∗) > 0. But, if c∗ < Mode(X) = E(X) and the distribution
is unimodal and symmetric, then it must be that g0(c∗) > 0.
Finally, let us show (iv). When g0(a) > 0 the proof is similar to that of (iii)
with the exception that for a unimodal and positively skewed density of beliefs
we have that Mode(X) < E(X). Note that when g0(a) > 0 the second-order
condition is satisfied and a < c∗ < Mode(X) < E(X). When g0(a) < 0 we have
a corner solution: c∗ =Mode(X) = a. Q.E.D.
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11.4 Prize Structures and Earnings from Forecasts
Table A1: UCSD’s 2004 Poker Classic Prizes
Winter Poker Classic - $10 entry fee Spring Poker Classic - $20 entry fee
Rank Prize Rank Prize
1st place $447 (27%) 1st place $792 (27%)
2nd place $209 (12%) 2nd place $370 (12%)
3rd place $164 (10%) 3rd place $290 (10%)
4th place $149 (9%) 4th place $264 (9%)
5th place $134 (8%) 5th place $238 (8%)
6th place $119 (7%) 6th place $211 (7%)
7th place $104 (6%) 7th place $185 (6%)
8th place $89 (5%) 8th place $158 (5%)
9th place $75 (4%) 9th place $132 (4%)
10th-18th places $20 (12%) 10th-18th places $40 (12%)
Sum $1670 (100%) Sum $3000 (100%)
Table A2: Sintra’s Chess Open Prizes
Rank Monetary Prize Symbolic Prize
1st place 300 euro (27%) Trophy
2nd place 180 euro (16%) Trophy
3rd place 120 euro (11%) Trophy
4th place 75 euro (7%) Medal
5th place 50 euro (5%) Medal
6th-10th places 30 euro (14%) Medal
11th-15th places 25 euro (11%) Medal
16th-20th places 20 euro (9%) Medal
Sum 1100 euro (100%) -
Table A3: Players’ Earnings from Forecasts
Winter Poker Classic Spring Poker Classic Sintra’s Chess Open
Reward Paid Reward Paid Reward Paid
$ 0 107 $ 0 105 0 euro 48
$ 1 4 $ 4 3 1 euro 0
$ 6 6 $11 2 6 euro 0
$ 9 4 $16 1 9 euro 10
$10 1 $19 1 10 euro 2
$20 4
Rewards $86 Rewards $149 Rewards 110 euro
Players 122 Players 116 Players 60
Average $.70 Average $1.28 Average 1.83 euro
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